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ABSTRACT
This Article attempts to answer the questions: Is secularism a 
nonnegotiable aspect of liberal constitutionalism? And can 
nonsecular state–church relationship models guarantee freedom of 
religion as an indispensable condition of liberal constitutionalism?
Hence this Article deals with the practice of religious freedom in 
countries representing distinct models of state–church relations from 
both a normative/theoretical and an empirical perspective. The 
normative part of the Article examines the different models of state–
religion relationships, while the empirical part will compare 
different national constitutional regulations on religious rights in 
three countries: Hungary (which became a liberal democracy after 
1989-90 but has been backsliding into an illiberal constitutional 
system since 2010); Israel (a liberal democracy with a very special 
accommodationist model); and Egypt (a country that between 2011 
and 2013 started to build up a democratic system with an illiberal 
theocratic constitutionalism). The hypothesis for my project is that 
the model of state–religion relations determines the state of religious 
freedom of a given country: The secular separationist model is by 
definition tolerant towards all religions, while the theocratic model 
is necessarily intolerant towards minority religions. But the three 
case studies should give an answer to the question raised in the title 
of this panel: at least from the perspective of freedom of religion, 
whether secularism is a nonnegotiable aspect of liberal 
constitutionalism. 
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MODELS OF STATE–RELIGION RELATIONS 
In his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington says that the key 
characteristic of Western culture has been the separation of church 
and state, something that he sees as foreign to the world’s other 
major religious systems: “In Islam, God is Caesar; in 
[Confucianism,] Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar’s junior 
partner.”1 Later in the book, he argues regarding Islam, 
Confucianism, and post-communist Europe: “The underlying 
problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam . . . 
Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarchy, 
and [] supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates 
obstacles to democratization . . . the central dividing line . . . is now 
the line separating the peoples of Western Christianity, on the one 
hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other.”2 His 
concluding question and answer are: “Where does Europe end? . . . 
[W]here Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy 
begin.”3
Alfred Stepan convincingly argues against Huntington that the 
greatest obstacles to liberal democracy, for instance, in Turkey or 
Egypt, are posed “not by Islam but by military and intelligence 
organizations unaccountable to democratic authority.”4 Both 
countries have more restrictions on freedom of religious expression 
within civil society and on freedom of organization within political 
society than any longstanding Western liberal democracy. The same 
1. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 70 (1996). 
2. Id. at 28, 217, 238.
3. Id. at 158. 
4. See Alfred Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,”
in WORLD RELIGIONS AND DEMOCRACY 18 (Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & 
Philip J. Costopoulos eds., 2005).
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applies to Orthodoxy in Russia, where the church is not really a 
relatively autonomous part of civil society because there is a high 
degree of subordination to secular power. Stepan also claims that 
separation of church and state and secularism are not intrinsic parts 
of the core definition of Western liberal democracy but the “minimal 
boundaries of freedom of action that must be crafted for political 
institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious 
individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions,” what he calls 
“twin tolerations.”5 By “twin tolerations,” Stepan means that 
(1) religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged 
prerogatives that allow them to mandate public policy to 
democratically elected governments; and (2) at the same time, 
individuals and religious communities, consistent with our 
institutional definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to 
worship privately.6 In other words, the one toleration obliges the 
state to protect and tolerate the freedom of religious institutions to 
operate in civil society, while the other one requires religious 
communities to tolerate each other by not deploying constitutional 
privileges or state power to squelch their competitors. Stepan adds to 
this concept that this institutional approach to liberal democracy 
necessarily implies that no group in civil society—including 
religious groups—can a priori be prohibited from forming a political 
party.7
Let us first see how West European democracies have met the 
requirements of “twin toleration.” Some of the European Union (EU) 
member states—Denmark, Finland, Greece, and the United Kingdom 
(in England and Scotland)—have established churches. Norway and 
Iceland, although not in the EU, are other European democracies 
with established churches. (Only Sweden disestablished the Lutheran 
Church in 2000.) Although Germany does not have an established 
church, Protestantism and Catholicism are recognized as official 
religions, and the majority of citizens pay a state-collected church 
5. See id. at 3. The essay originally appeared in Alfred Stepan, Religion,
Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,” 11 J. DEMOCRACY 37 (2000). A much 
longer and more extensively footnoted version appeared in ALFRED STEPAN, The 
World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the “Twin Tolerations,” in
ARGUING COMPARATIVE POLITICS 213 (2001).
6. See STEPAN, supra note 5, at 217.
7. As is well known, Christian Democratic parties have frequently ruled in 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The two European countries 
whose constitutions prohibit political parties from using religious affiliations or 
symbols are Portugal and Turkey.
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tax. The two European countries with “hostile” separations of church 
and state are France and Turkey. This means that three distinct 
models of state–religion relations can be differentiated in 
contemporary Europe: the one with an established church, the 
militant secular, and the mixed one with a dominant, but civil 
church. Silvio Ferrari describes these models using one country for 
each: English multiculturalism, French secularism, and Catholic civil 
religion in Italy.8 Ferrari concludes that there are sharp distinctions 
between the religious freedom of individuals, which all European 
states protect, and the status of religious communities and 
institutions, which are subject to restrictions.9 In another work on 
Europe, Ferrari claims that it is necessary to go beyond the 
traditional classification of church–state relations and look at the 
common principles that are the basis of the European model of state–
religion relations.10 But the lesson from the European picture is that 
liberal democracies are compatible with both established churches 
and with unfriendly separation of church and state approaches. 
Therefore the concepts of secularism and the separation of state and 
religion have a place in Western European liberal democracy only in 
the context of Stepan’s “twin tolerations”. This means that we have 
to “leave room for democratic bargaining and the nonliberal public 
argument within religious communities that it sometimes requires.”11
Despite the fact that the Americas and Europe are considered to 
be exceptionally secular, constitutional declarations of state 
secularity are more pronounced in the countries of Asia and Africa: 
Twenty-two African and nine Asian constitutions affirm the 
secularity of the state either in their preambles or in their main 
texts.12 A minority of nine of the world’s forty-four Muslim-majority 
countries declare themselves to be “Islamic states,” while eleven 
declare themselves to be secular or laic.13 In other words, a higher 
8. See Silvio Ferrari, Models of State–Religion Relations in Western 
Europe, in THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GLOBAL CHALLENGES 202, 202
(Allen D. Hertzke ed., 2013).
9. See id. at 212.
10. Silvio Ferrari, The Legal Dimension, in MUSLIMS IN THE ENLARGED 
EUROPE: RELIGION AND SOCIETY 219, 226 (Brigitte Maréchal et al. eds., 2003).
11. See Stepan, supra note 4, at 11.
12. See Silvio Ferrari, Constitution et Religion, in 3 Traité international de
droit constitutionnel: Suprématie de la Constitution 437, 451 (Michel Troper & 
Dominique Chagnollaud eds., 2013). 
13. John T.S. Madeley, Constitutional Models and the Protection of 
Religious Freedom, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND RELIGION 209, 212 
(Silvio Ferrari ed., 2015).
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proportion of Muslim-majority countries have opted for ostensibly 
secular constitutions than the world’s Christian-majority countries. 
But the original meaning of secularism and the separation of church 
and state are in permanent change also outside Europe.14 In both 
India and Israel, for instance, by the 1990s, secular political 
traditions were challenged by opposition movements that drew some 
of their support to accommodate more fundamentalist and less 
tolerant visions of the polity. But even the separation of church and 
state originally mandated by the U.S. Constitution’s First 
Amendment (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”15)
did not prohibit the thirteen original states from having their own 
established religions. It merely prohibited the Congress from 
establishing one official religion for the United States as a whole. 
In trying to define the models of state–religion relationship all 
around the world, one can use Ran Hirschl’s book, which 
differentiates nine extant models of state and religion relations.16 For 
the purposes of this study, I use a less sophisticated structure of 
models, leaving out the communist regimes’ atheist state model at 
the non-liberal end of the continuum and the illiberal pure theocratic 
model where supreme religious and political leadership is unified, 
such as in the former Hindu Kingdom or Nepal or Saudi Arabia, 
where the Quran and Sunna are the constitutions.17 I put the 
remaining constitutionalist models into three major categories. 
14. The secular state is a recognition of the fact that in a society of many 
competing beliefs, no one set could reasonably be set up as normative. See KEITH 
WARD, RELIGION & COMMUNITY 106-07 (2000). In other words, in a religiously 
plural society, secularism prevents state identification with one religion. Both the 
rigid nineteenth century and the more “friendly” concept of separation of state and 
religion, which later permits state cooperation and support with religious 
organizations, are related to the idea of a secular state. The core of the separation 
lies in the independence of the constituent power from every religious law that 
claims to limit the state’s right to make laws. Although separation of state and 
church is more frequent in countries that affirm the secular character of the state, as 
Silvio Ferrari argues this relationship is not necessarily organic, since less than one 
third of secular states are also “separationist.” See Ferrari, supra note 12, at 466. 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 47-49 (2010). 
17. “A state that has union with a particular religious order is a theocratic 
state, governed by divine laws directly administered by a priestly order claiming 
divine commission.” See Rajeev Bhargava, Secular Politico-Legal Regimes in 
Religiously Homogenous and Diverse Societies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND RELIGION, supra note 13, at 229-43.
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The first model is the secular separationist. The Establishment 
and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution represent one of the subcategories of the model of 
separationism, where secularism is treated as neutral.18 Hirschl 
describes the Canadian and the postapartheid South African state–
religion relationships, along with other immigrant societies’ 
approaches, as “softer version[s] of [a] formal separation 
accompanied by a true commitment to multiculturalism and 
diversity.”19 Another “more . . . de facto scenario than . . . de jure 
model[] involves countries where formal separation of church and 
state, as well as religious freedoms more generally, is 
constitutionally guaranteed” with de facto dominance of one 
church.20 Some predominantly Catholic countries in Europe, such as 
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Slovakia, and Hungary, either 
removed or formally never had the special status of Catholicism in 
their constitutions but de facto still acknowledge the dominance of 
the Catholic Church. 
The second large model is that of the religious establishment. 
Its weak form is represented in the designation of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church as the “state church” in the Scandinavian 
countries.21 “In England, the monarch is the ‘supreme governor’ of 
the Church of England and ‘defender of the faith.’”22 The 
constitution in Greece, without explicitly recognizing it as a state 
church, declares that the Greek Orthodox Christian religion is the 
prevailing religion in the country. “A[nother] diluted version of this 
model operates in Germany, where the institutional apparatuses of 
the Evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish religious communities are 
18. In the current political system of the United States, however, the 
separation of faith and government is more cozy than it should be. For instance, 
Rick Perry, then the governor of Texas and presidential candidate in the 2012 race, 
gathered some 30,000 people, most of them evangelical Christians, in a Houston 
stadium for an event called “The Response: A Call to Prayer for a Nation in Crisis.” 
Rick Perry, Governor, The Response: A Call to Prayer for a Nation in Crisis (Aug. 
6, 2011). Also, “Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore . . . who once put up a granite 
monument to the Ten Commandments in the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial 
System building . . . [in an interview] said, ‘Our rights, contained in the Bill of 
Rights, do not come from the Constitution, they come from God.’” See Frank Bruni, 
Too Much Prayer in Politics: Republicans, the Religious Right, and Evolution, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/opinion/sunday/frank-
bruni-republicans-the-religious-right-and-evolution.html [https://perma.cc/4UKN-2SN9].
19. See HIRSCHL, supra note 16, at 28.
20. See id. at 29.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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designated as public corporations and therefore qualify for state 
support from the German church tax.”23 Hirschl calls the approach, 
where the general law is secular but a degree of jurisdictional 
autonomy is granted to religious communities, primarily in matters 
of personal status and education, “religious jurisdictional enclaves,” 
listing Kenya, India, Israel, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, 
Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and 
Tanzania under this model.24 Israel’s government involvement in 
religion is low for the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region but 
relatively high on a global scale.25 As Hirschl argues, the state in 
such a setting has an embedded interest in preserving or promoting a 
viable “state religion” to the extent that this religion provides 
meaning to the national meta-narratives that constitute the nation as 
such.26 He also mentions other less formal illustrations of this logic, 
such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in Serbia, which both show close ties between 
nationalism and religious affiliation. As I will discuss later in more 
detail, the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 declares that the 
state and religious communities shall operate separately. Therefore, 
the country belongs to the model of formal separation with de facto 
dominance of the Catholic Church, but with a strong emphasis on 
“the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood” and with other 
characteristics of an illiberal democracy.27
The third model—theocracy—can be labeled as one type of 
constitutionalism in illiberal polities.28 Hirschl provides a more 
detailed description of theocratic constitutions by outlining their four 
main elements: 
(1) adherence to some or all core elements of modern constitutionalism, 
including the formal distinction between political authority and religious 
23. See id.
24. See id. at 30-40.
25. The government involvement in religion (GIR) score in Israel is 37, 
while in Saudi Arabia it is 78, and in Iran, 67. See Madeley, supra note 13, at 219-
21.
26. See HIRSCHL, supra note 16, at 29.
27. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF 
HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY pmbl.
28. See Li-Ann Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133, 133-52 (Michel Rosenfeld 
& András Sajó eds., 2012). This also discusses communitarian constitutions as the 
other type of illiberal constitutionalism, like the ones in South Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, where the well-being of the nation, the community, and society receive 
utilitarian priority rather than the individual freedom principle of liberalism. See id. 
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authority[, the existence of a constitutional catalogue of rights,] and the 
existence of some form of active judicial review; (2) the presence of a 
single religion or religious denomination that is formally endorsed by the 
state [as the] “state religion”; (3) the constitutional enshrining of the 
religion and its texts, directives, and interpretations as a or the main source 
of legislation and judicial interpretation of laws—essentially, laws may 
not infringe on injunctions of the state-endorsed religion; and (4) a nexus 
of religious bodies and tribunals that often not only carry symbolic weight 
but are also granted official jurisdictional status . . . and operate in lieu of, 
or in an uneasy tandem with, a civil court system.29
The two subcategories, which are the closest to the ideal type 
of constitutional theocracy, are the model of secular jurisdictional 
enclaves and the mixed system of religious law and general law 
principles.30 In the former, most of the law is religious; “however, 
certain areas of the law, such as economic law, are ‘carved out’ and 
insulated from influence by religious law.”31 For instance, “Saudi 
Arabia, arguably one of the countries whose legal system comes 
closest to being fully based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), . . .
exempted the entire finance, banking, and corporate capital sectors 
from the application of Shari’a rules.”32 The mixed system comes the 
closest to the ideal model of constitutional theocracy.33 According to 
the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Shari’a is 
superior even to the Constitution itself. The Guardian Council, a de 
facto constitutional court, is composed of six mullahs appointed by 
the supreme leader and six jurists proposed by the head of the 
judicial system and voted on by the Majles, the Iranian parliament, 
which means that the Constitution also respects the popular source of 
sovereignty, the elected parliament, and some separation of powers 
29. See HIRSCHL, supra note 16, at 3.
30. See id. at 21-49. Similarly to Hirschl, others argue that there are two 
distinct subcategories of theocratic constitutions: the Iranian, where Islam is granted 
an authoritative central role within the bounds of a constitution, and the Saudi 
Arabian, where Islam is present without the formal authority of modern 
constitutionalism. See Chibli Mallat, Islam and the Constitutional Order, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 
1287, 1287-303.
31. See HIRSCHL, supra note 16, at 33.
32. See id.
33. Saudi Arabia (with 78) and Iran (with 67) score first and second on the 
government involvement in religion (GIR) measure of regulatory burdening in the 
religious field, which accords with what is widely known about their theocratic 
systems of government, their treatment of certain religious minorities, their 
extensive system of regulation, and their privileging of religious legislation. See
Madeley, supra note 13, at 219-21.
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principles.34 Article 2 of the various Egyptian constitutions of 1971, 
2012, and 2014, declared Shari’a as “a” or “the” primary source of 
legislation, and the Supreme Constitutional Court has always 
grappled with the contested status and role of Shari’a.35 In other 
words, constitutional theocracies are constitutional systems but not 
necessarily liberal ones. 
HUNGARY: RESTRICTIVE FORMAL SEPARATION 
In Hungary the center-right government of FIDESZ, the 
Alliance of Young Democrats, with its tiny Christian Democratic 
coalition partner, received more than 50% of the actual votes, and 
due to the disproportional election system, it won two-thirds of the 
seats in the 2010 Parliamentary elections.36 With this overwhelming 
majority, it was able to enact a new constitution without the votes of 
the weak opposition parties. But this constitutionalist exercise aimed 
at an illiberal constitution. The new constitution, entitled the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary, which was passed by the Parliament 
on April 18, 2011, similar to the Israeli and the Egyptian approach, 
shows the role of religion in national legitimation. The document 
characterizes the country not only as the community of ethnic 
Hungarians but also as a Christian community, narrowing even 
further the range of people who can recognize themselves as 
belonging to it. The preamble to the Fundamental Law, which must 
be taken into consideration when interpreting the main text,37
commits itself to a branch of Christianity, the Hungarian Roman 
Catholic tradition. According to the text of the preamble, “We are 
proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian state on solid 
ground and made our country a part of Christian Europe.”38 The 
34. Council of Guardians, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA (last updated Feb. 
18, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Council-of-Guardians [https://perma.
cc/8H2D-P7DU].
35. For more about the jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
before the Arab Spring, see TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007); NATHAN J.
BROWN, EGYPT: A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
(2013).
36. See Round 2 of the Parliamentary Election of 2010, NATIONAL 
ELECTION OFFICE (HUNGARY) (last updated May 11, 2011), http://www.valasztas.hu/
en/parval2010/298/298_0_index.html [https://perma.cc/47EQ-2CPP].
37. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF 
HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY art. R, para. 3.
38. Id. pmbl. 
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members of the Hungarian nation recognize the “role of Christianity 
in preserving nationhood” and honor the fact that the Holy Crown 
“embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood.”39
Besides the sacral symbols, this choice of ideology is reflected—
inter alia—in the Fundamental Law’s concept of community, its 
preferred family model,40 and its provision regarding the protection 
of embryonic and foetal life from the moment of conception.41
The preamble, while giving preference to the thousand-year-old 
Christian tradition, states that “[w]e value the various religious 
traditions of our country.”42 The choice of words displays its model 
of tolerance, under which the various worldviews do not have equal 
status, although following them is not impeded by prohibition and 
persecution. It is, however, significant that the tolerance thus 
declared extends to the various “religious traditions” but does not 
apply to the more recently established branches of religion or to 
those that are new to Hungary or to nonreligious convictions of 
conscience. 
Before January 1, 2012, when the new constitution became 
law, the Hungarian parliament prepared a blizzard of so-called 
“cardinal”—or “super-majority”—laws, changing the shape of 
virtually every political institution in Hungary and making the 
guarantee of constitutional rights less secure. One of these cardinal 
laws was the law on the status of churches, according to which the 
power to designate legally recognized churches is vested in the 
Parliament itself. The law listed fourteen legally recognized churches 
and required all other previously registered churches (more than 200 
religious organizations in total) to either re-register under 
considerably more demanding new criteria or continue to operate as 
religious associations without the legal benefits offered to recognized 
churches (like tax exemptions and the ability to operate state-
subsidized religious schools). After this new law went into effect, 
only eighteen of the deregistered churches have been able to re-
register, so the vast majority of previously registered churches have 
been deprived of their status as legal entities. Because registration 
requires an internal democratic decision-making structure and 
transparent finances, the majority of previously registered churches 
were not able to continue to operate with any legal recognition under 
39. Id.
40. Id. art. L, para. 1.
41. Id. art. II.
42. Id. pmbl. 
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the new regime, either because they did not elect their religious 
leaders or because anonymous giving constituted part of their 
financing. Nontraditional and nonmainstream religious 
communities—which had not faced legal obstacles between 1989 
and 2011—are now facing increasing hardships and discrimination 
as a result. 
In February 2013, the Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional parts of the law regulating the parliamentary 
registration of churches. In April 2013, in response to this decision, 
the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law elevated the 
annulled provisions into the main text of the Fundamental Law with 
the intention of excluding further constitutional review.43 Even 
though the Constitutional Court argued that the registration of 
churches by the Parliament does not provide a fair procedure for the 
applicants, this procedure became part of the constitution. That 
effectively means a very serious restriction on the freedom to 
establish new churches in Hungary. 
On the basis of an application brought by nine religious 
communities and individuals, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in its judgment of April 9, 2014, in the case of Magyar 
Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary, found that 
Hungary’s unconstitutional church law also violated Article 9 on the 
right of religious freedom of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.44 Hungary appealed the decision to the Grand Chamber. The 
Grand Chamber rejected that appeal, so on September 9, 2014, the 
decision became final and binding.45
As a reaction to the ECtHR judgment, in December 2015, the 
government submitted the Fifth Amendment to the Church Law. The 
amended law planned to replace the two-tiered system of 
classification for religious communities with a three-tiered system, 
consisting of “religious associations,” “registered churches,” and 
“certified churches.” Future classification within the categories 
would be determined by a court. Additionally, the draft law allows 
43. [FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY] art. IV 
(2013).
44. Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház & Others v. Hungary, App. Nos. 
70945/11, 23611/12, 26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12, 41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12, 
56581/12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
45. See Forum for Religious Freedom Eur., Hungary: Government Ignores 
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, at 1, ORG. SECURITY & CO-
OPERATION EUR. (July 2-3, 2015), http://www.osce.org/pc/169046?download=true 
[https://perma.cc/HNW2-43J3].
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the state to enter into “cooperative agreements” with individual 
religious communities on a discretionary basis in order to subsidize 
public interest activities performed by those religious communities.46
The amendment would have marked a significant improvement 
over earlier versions of the Church Law in that it provided explicit 
rights and protections for religious communities classified in the 
lower tiers. It would have also curtailed the role of Parliament in 
allocating legal recognition to religious groups. According to the 
draft law, all groups previously recognized as “incorporated 
churches” (previously the highest tier) would have been 
automatically recognized as “certified churches” after the 
amendments went into effect.47 This meant that “incorporated 
churches” would have been exempted from applying to the court 
while religious associations would have been required to do so. 
Groups belonging to the lowest tier, that is, “religious associations,” 
would not have been allowed to collect the 1% church tax, which 
directly supports the religious activities of religious communities.48
This discriminatory rule would have been in explicit contradiction to 
the above-mentioned ECtHR judgment, as the entire “amendment[] 
fail[s] to address the most serious violations of the right of religious 
freedom identified by the Court,” because “transitional provisions 
with the proposed amendments would perpetuate, rather than correct 
the earlier violations of the ECtHR [and] discretionary powers 
afforded the state would continue the arbitrary recognition procedure 
criticized by both the ECtHR and the Venice Commission.”49
Even this moderate amendment, according to which religious 
communities with the exception of the “incorporated churches” still 
would not have enjoyed full religious freedom, was not enacted by 
the governing majority. “Denied equality under the law and subject 
to opaque regulations, deregistered religious communities, like 
[NGOs unpopular in the eyes of the government], are subject to 
46. See Az egyházügyi törvény módosításának koncepciója [Concept, Fifth 




47. See Forum for Religious Freedom Eur., Hungary: Amended Church 
Law Remains at Variance with OSCE Standards and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ORG. SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUR. (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/186866?download=true [https://perma.cc/48QA-BNCB].
48. See id.
49. See id. (explaining the recommendations regarding the draft 
amendment). 
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arbitrary and expensive audits, hindered or prevented from raising 
money, attacked in the government controlled media, and harassed 
by local officials.”50
In other words, it isn’t easy to characterize the state and 
religion relations in Hungary using Hirschl’s models. It is certainly 
not theocratic constitutionalism, but it is not a religious 
establishment approach of the type that exists in some of Europe’s 
most liberal and progressive polities, such as Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, and Iceland.51 The latter have a formal, mainly ceremonial 
designation of a certain religion as the “state religion.” Nor does 
Hungary resemble Germany, where the institutional apparatus of the 
Evangelical, Catholic, and “Jewish religious communities are 
designated as public corporations and therefore qualify for state 
support from the German church tax.”52 Hungary’s unique system is 
perhaps closest to a more de facto scenario than a de jure model, 
where formal separation of church and state, as well as religious 
freedom more generally, is constitutionally guaranteed, but emerging 
patterns of politically systemized hegemony of the Catholic Church 
and religion-centric morality is present in the constitutional arena. 
This illiberal approach to the state–religion relationship is similar to 
the previously mentioned approach in Ireland. The preamble of the 
new Hungarian Fundamental Law, entitled National Avowal states: 
“We hold that the family and the nation constitute the principal 
framework of our coexistence, and that our fundamental cohesive 
values are fidelity, faith and love.”53 According to Article L of the 
Fundamental Law: “(1) Hungary shall protect the institution of 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman established by 
voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the survival of the 
nation.”54
While a completely neutral constitutional text is almost 
impossible, these provisions very much challenge the autonomy of 
individuals who do not accept the normative life models expressed in 
the Fundamental Law’s ideological values—as the preamble words 
50. See Letter from David Baer, Tex. Lutheran Univ., to The Economist & 
Human Rights Without Frontiers (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.hrwf.net/images/
forbnews/2014/Hungary_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/89AX-HJY3].
51. See HIRSCHL, supra note 16, at 29.
52. See Hungary: Government Ignores Judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights, supra note 45.
53. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF 
HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY pmbl.
54. See id. art. L. 
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it: “the form in which we want to live”—and they are capable of 
ostracizing them from the political community.55 This double speech 
of formal separation and factual nonseparation of the Hungarian 
government can also be detected in political statements. “Zoltán 
Balog, minister of human resources and an ordained Hungarian 
Reformed minister, ruffled the feathers of those who take the 
separation of church and state seriously” by announcing that 
“religion is not a private matter; the confession of faith is the most 
personal public issue.”56
ISRAEL: STRONG ESTABLISHMENTARIANISM WITH RELIGIOUS 
JUDICIAL ENCLAVES 
During Israel’s history, various individual and collective 
religious and national identities have developed, which are reflected 
in the country’s constitution and parallel legal systems.57
Israel, as a religiously deeply divided society, has turned in 
recent years to religion to justify its claim to statehood. In response 
to persistent delegitimation from within and without, the current 
government seems to support nonsecular Zionism’s efforts to expand 
the role of religion to provide it with political legitimation.58 This 
“religionization” of Israeli Jewish society, together with an ethnic 
division within the framework of a single territorial entity (due to the 
failure of the political leadership to reach a two-state territorial 
solution), leads to a form of Jewish nationalism based on a collective 
identity rooted in religion, which might well defeat “Israeliness” as 
an identity and important democratic principles, including the rights 
55. See id. pmbl. 
56. Vissza a Középkorba? Balog Szerint a Vallás nem Magánügy [Back to 
the Middle Ages? According to Balog, Religion Is Not a Private Matter], NOL.HU 
(Apr. 30, 2016), http://nol.hu/belfold/vissza-a-kozepkorba-balog-szerint-a-vallas-
nem-maganugy-1613639 [https://perma.cc/Y8X8-YMGJ]; see also Religion Is Not a 
Private Matter According to the Hungarian Government, HUNGARIAN SPECTRUM
(May 22, 2016), http://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/05/22/religion-is-not-a-private-
matter-according-to-the-hungarian-government/ [https://perma.cc/D9M4-9SZG] 
(providing the article in English).
57. See SUZIE NAVOT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 70-72, 309-18 
(2007) (describing Israel as a Jewish state and the constitutional relationship 
between religion and state in Israel). 
58. See generally Uriel Abulof, The Roles of Religion in National 
Legitimation: Judaism and Zionism’s Elusive Quest for Legitimacy (APSA 2013 
Annual Meeting Paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2303131 [https://perma.cc/89UT-DM4C] (discussing the emergence of religious 
Zionism as a response to various sources of delegitimation toward Israel).
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of national and religious minorities.59 The State of Israel from the 
beginning of its establishment “embodie[d] an equivocal mix of 
constitutive principles that cannot be resolved in favor of either its 
liberal or illiberal elements,”60 but the political aspirations of the 
current Israeli government for more illiberal constitutionalism seems 
to be the decisive element to find similarly restrictive measures for 
freedom of religion.
As regards the relationship of religious and state law seen in 
the example of the use of Halakhic law and Palestinian-Arab millet 
system regulating marriage and divorce, a liberal demand to establish 
exclusively civil marriage would most probably not be accepted by 
the majority of the public.61 Not only religious, but also partly 
secular Jews and Arabs, would oppose this approach and opt for 
religious marriage and divorce even if civil marriage were available. 
It would be difficult to find an overlapping consensus62 in the matter 
between an arrangement based on liberal considerations and those 
based on religious–national ones. In this situation the state has to act
positively to provide citizens with the ability to realize their 
autonomy to marry and divorce, but the liberal state also must use its 
authority, if necessary, via civil courts to help spouses who do not 
perceive themselves as divorced and cannot remarry without a 
religious “get.” This approach is consistent with the views of the vast 
liberal literature on the boundaries of autonomy that the liberal state 
should grant to a nonliberal minority group operating within its 
59. This description of nationalism very much fits the definition of the 
nation by the French philosopher, Ernest Renan: “A nation is therefore a large-scale 
solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past 
and of those that one is prepared to make in the future.” Ernest Renan, What Is a 
Nation?, in BECOMING NATIONAL 42, 53 (Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny eds., 
1996). But as Ethan Bonner reminds us, Renan also added to this definition that a 
nation is “a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of 
their neighbors.” See Ethan Bronner, Israel: The Revised Edition, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
14, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/books/israel-the-revised-edition.html 
[https://perma.cc/R6KV-4QBA].
60. Graham Walker, The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism, in
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 154, 159 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997).
61. See Eric Cortellessa, Why Is There No Civil Marriage in Israel?, TIMES 
ISR. (July 12, 2015, 2:03 AM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/why-is-there-no-civil-
marriage-in-israel/ [https://perma.cc/4WVB-8XMA] (describing how the Israeli 
government failed to pass a bill that would recognize civil marriages).
62. See generally John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1987) (defining an overlapping consensus as a 
longterm framework that reconciles opposing religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines). 
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realm.63 The same approach has been taken by the High Court of 
Justice in the Emanuel case, where an ultra-Orthodox school, upon 
the request of one group of the parents, separated the Ashkenazi and 
Sephardic students.64 The High Court of Justice, representing liberal 
culture, declared the action of the school on behalf of the illiberal 
Ashkenazi religious group as segregation and discrimination on 
ethnic grounds and ordered that the action be abolished.65
A parallel civil and religious marriage and divorce track would 
enable and even legitimize marriage between Jews and non-Jews, 
and, in addition to the traditional Jewish elements, would support the 
Western liberal cultural element of the State’s identity, together with 
“Israeliness” as a collective identity. The same applies to matters 
relating to the historical system of conversion, another part of 
personal law, which can also be maintained, not at the expense of, 
but in conjunction with uniform civil systems of law.66
Special Conversion Courts, established by the state but staffed 
by Orthodox Rabbis and following Orthodox practice, have been 
very slow to approve conversions of immigrants from the former 
Soviet Union and in particular have been rejecting many candidates 
for conversion on the basis of their alleged failure to commit to 
observing Jewish religious commandments. This strict interpretation 
of Orthodox Jewish religious rules was contrary to the official stance 
of the courts as published by the government on its website: A 
declaration of intent to observe Jewish religious commandments is
sufficient. 
The same is true about the question of how Sabbath work 
restrictions should be construed; whether they should be perceived 
63. See generally MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 
(2011). See also WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); 
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS (1995); AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001). 
64. HCJ 1067/08 Noar KeHalacha Ass’n v. Ministry of Educ. 63(2) PD 398 
(2009) (Isr.).
65. See id.; see also Haim Shapira, Equality in Religious Schools—Should 
the Court Intervene?, Address at Princeton University Conference on Religions, 
Rights, and Institutions (Nov. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author) (giving a critical evaluation of the Noar KeHalacha Association v. Ministry 
of Education decision with the similar judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court in the Jewish Free School case).
66. See Leora Batnitzky, Is Conversion a Human Right? A Comparative 
Look at Religious Zionism and Hindu Nationalism, Address at Princeton University 
Conference on Religions, Rights, and Institutions (Nov. 23, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author).
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and enforced as a day of rest or as a day of leisure.67 The controversy 
surrounding this issue, marriage, conversion, and other issues 
touched upon above present another microcosm of religious–secular 
tensions and quest for identity in Israeli society and another product 
of a Kulturkampf.68
Israel, with its traditional values, a strong sense of community, 
and national interest, cannot be considered a liberal state forged 
entirely in the Western mold,69 but it also cannot return to pre-
modern political conditions. Rather it has to move in the direction of 
soft legal pluralism70 controlled by the state. Of course, the hard 
question is: how much, and exactly which tradition, has to be 
acknowledged and integrated into the culture of the new society. In 
his recent book, Michael Walzer concludes that, although the total 
negation of exilic Judaism has failed, the secular Zionist modernizers 
should have sought a compromise with religion that would not have 
provoked the counterrevolution a generation later.71 Walzer argues 
that some elements of “traditionalist world views” needed and “still 
need[] to be[] negated: the fearfulness and passivity . . . , the 
dominance of the rabbis, the subordination of women,” and the role 
of the Jewish courts.72 But as I have shown in this Article, the secular 
modernists did compromise: by not taking away power over 
marriage and divorce from the religious authorities. I argued that this 
67. See id.
68. Ruth Gavison goes as far as to claim that the question of work on 
Sabbath is not about religious or secular accomodation, the freedom to practice 
religion, or the freedom not to practice religion, but rather about the culture war. See
Ruth Gavison, Days of Worship and Days of Rest: A View from Israel, in RELIGION 
IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GERMAN, ISRAELI, AMERICAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 379, 409 (Winfried Brugger & Michael Karayanni eds., 
2007). 
69. This can be the conclusion in many other areas not discussed here as 
well. For instance, a study on bioethics in Isreal concludes that due to a fine line 
between the demands of autonomy-based secular bioethics and religious norms 
granting great weight to the sanctity of life, Israel is different from mainstream 
liberal democracies. See generally Michael L. Gross & Vardit Ravitsky, Israel: 
Bioethics in a Jewish-Democratic State, 12 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 247 
(2003).
70. See John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 8 (1986). More generally, religious pluralism is commonly 
understood as several religions co-existing within the same society. See Peter 
Berger, Desecularization, AM. INT. (May 13, 2015), http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2015/05/13/desecularization/ [perma.cc/4J2J-HEA7]. 
71. See MICHAEL WALZER, THE PARADOX OF LIBERATION: SECULAR 
REVOLUTIONS AND RELIGIOUS COUNTERREVOLUTIONS 125-26 (2015). 
72. See id.
192 Michigan State Law Review 2017
compromise was necessary, even though the religious 
fundamentalists never really accepted the supremacy of the secular 
state in the first place.73 I do not share the view of Marxists critics 
that secular revolutionaries weren’t “absolutist” enough.74 My claim 
is that their compromise went too far, and contrary to Ben-Gurion’s 
expectations, the State of Israel lost control over its own religious 
establishment much more than in countries with similarly established 
churches. Examples include Greece, where civil marriage exists, or 
even Malaysia, where there is civil marriage at least for non-
Muslims. Israel almost became a theocratic state for the sake of the 
religious freedom of (ultra)Orthodox Jews, who, as a political 
faction, do not exhibit appropriate respect for the rights of non-
Orthodox religious, non-religious Jewish, and non-Jewish citizens. 
In more general terms, Israel, after the repeated failures of the 
“peace process” and the two-state solution, faces very limited 
options. It either remains Jewish but ceases to be a democracy, or 
else it becomes a genuinely multi-ethnic democracy but would in 
that case cease to be “Jewish.”75 This choice became even more 
realistic after Likud won the March 17, 2015 elections, as Prime 
Minister Netanyahu declared that he will never permit a two-state 
solution between Israelis and Palestinians, adding: “Anyone who is 
going to establish a Palestinian state, anyone who is going to 
evacuate territories today, is simply giving a base for attacks to the 
73. In his review on Walzer’s book, Michael Ignatieff criticizes Walzer for 
failing to ask the question of whether the fundamentalists were ever willing to 
accept the secular view. See Michael Ignatieff, The Religious Specter Haunting 
Revolution, 62 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 66 (June 4, 2015).
74. This is the position of Perry Anderson regarding the Indian case. See
Perry Anderson, After Nehru, 34 LONDON REV. BOOKS 21 (Aug. 2, 2012).
75. These alternatives were drawn up by Tony Judt first in 2003, and then 
in his draft paper written in the summer of 2009, published in 2015. See Tony Judt, 
Israel: The Alternative, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 23, 2003), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2003/10/23/israel-the-alternative/ [https://perma.cc/3W56-BH89]; Tony 
Judt, What Is to Be Done?, in WHEN THE FACTS CHANGE: ESSAYS 1995-2010 156 
(Jennifer Homans ed., 2015). In the latter work, Judt also mentions a third outcome, 
whereby Israel forcibly removes a majority of its Arabs (or makes it intolerable for 
them to remain), which would indeed ensure the survival of a Jewish democracy but 
at a grotesque and ultimately self-destructive price. In his last interview, Judt again 
promotes a binational or federal arrangement as the only viable solution in the 
current circumstances of Israel. See Merav Michaeli, Tony Judt’s Final Word on 
Israel, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2011/09/tony-judts-final-word-on-israel/245051/ [https://perma.cc/XFH2-
YVEP].
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radical Islam against Israel.”76 Even though two days after the 
election victory Netanyahu tried to backtrack from his declaration by 
saying that he only intended to argue that the two-state solution was 
impossible right now, the pre-election statement calls into question 
the commitment in his speech in June 2009 at Bar Ilan University 
where he said: “In this small land of ours, two peoples live freely, 
side by side, in amity and mutual respect. Each will have its own 
flag, its own national anthem, its own government. Neither will 
threaten the security or survival of the other. . . . We will be ready in 
a future peace agreement to reach a solution where a demilitarized 
Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish state.”77
But after the elections, Netanyahu did not say he was ready to 
return to negotiations or to present any new plans for achieving 
peace. One of the very likely consequences of Netanyahu’s victory 
for the near and the midterm future will be more hypernationalist, 
anti-democratic legislation, including a new basic law on Israel as 
the Nation-State of the Jewish People.78 Some argue that with his 
statement, Netanyahu made explicit the implicit beliefs and attitudes 
which are the real foundations of Zionist, Jewish Israel, or at the very 
least, of many of its citizens.79 In other words, giving up the two-
state solution, even if because “the reality has changed,” also ends 
any immediate hope for the position of liberal Zionism, which claims 
that the Jewish state must not deprive the legitimate national 
76. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Israel’s PM Netanyahu: No Palestinian State 
on My Watch, CNN (Mar. 16, 2015, 6:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/
16/middleeast/israel-netanyahu-palestinian-state/ [https://perma.cc/2VNE-CHHS].
77. As Thomas Friedman argued after election day, with this statement 
Netanyahu will be the father of the one-state solution. See Thomas L. Friedman, 
Netanyahu Will Make History, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/03/19/opinion/thomas-friedman-bibi-will-make-history.html 
[https://perma.cc/4CX8-KR2H].
78. In his prediction, David Shulman also lists more deliberate and 
consistent attempts to undermine the authority of the courts (especially the Supreme 
Court), more rampant racism, more thugs in high office, more acts of cruelty 
inflicted on innocents, more hate propaganda and self-righteous whining by official 
spokesmen, more discrimination against the Israeli-Arab population, more wanton 
destruction of the villages of Israeli Bedouins, more warmongering, and quite 
possibly more needless war. See David Shulman, Bibi: The Hidden Consequences of 
His Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2015/04/23/bibi-hidden-consequences-his-victory/ [https://perma.cc/9NJP-V5QY]. 
79. See Anat Biletzki, Making It Explicit in Israel, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2015, 6:50 AM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/making-it-
explicit-in-israel/ [https://perma.cc/6YAF-N7RF].
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aspirations of Palestinians.80 The one-state solution means that Israel 
will become, in time, either a non-Jewish democracy or a Jewish 
nondemocracy. 
EGYPT: THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
The role of religion in legitimation of the regime before and 
after its change can also be interesting to study in the case of Egypt, 
one of the countries of the Arab Spring, where the constitution was 
and continued to be theocratic. As we will show, the role of Shari’a 
as a source of legislation in the various Egyptian constitutions did 
not really change through the Mubarak, Morsi, and Al-Sisi eras, 
which also means that Muslim states use Islam for national 
legitimation by claiming their nation needs to be Muslim in the sense 
that Shari’a must be the law of the land. 
As recent comparative research conducted by Dawood Ahmed 
and Tom Ginsburg that examines Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Iraq 
concludes, the Islamic supremacy clauses that originated in British 
colonial law are not only popularly supported but were introduced in 
these countries during moments of liberalization and modernization, 
and are in most cases accompanied by an expansion, and not a 
reduction, in rights provided by the constitution.81 Many Muslim 
states’ constitutions include express provisions concerning religious 
freedom and the treatment of religious minorities. To protect the 
interest of religious minorities, these constitutions may include 
nondiscrimination clauses that protect individuals from religious 
discrimination. Additionally, Muslim-majority countries’ 
constitutions may include provisions that protect the religious 
freedom of individuals. 
However, the comparative study of Clark Lombardi, which 
besides Egypt and Iraq also included Kuwait, Sudan, the Yemen 
Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, states 
that provisions stating that Islamic law is the chief source of 
80. See Jonathan Freedland, The Liberal Zionists, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 
14, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/08/14/liberal-zionists/ [https://
perma.cc/N8GY-ZDVN]; see also Jonathan Freedland, Liberal Zionism After Gaza,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 26, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/07/26/
liberal-zionism-after-gaza/ [https://perma.cc/E8ZZ-QH53].
81. See Dawood I. Ahmed & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization 
and Human Rights: The Suprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in 
Constitutions (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 
No. 477, 2014). 
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legislation are generally understood today to mean that states are 
constitutionally barred from enacting un-Islamic legislation.82
Moreover, under certain circumstances, a constitution that does not 
make Islamic law the chief source of legislation will also be 
interpreted to prohibit un-Islamic legislation.83 Therefore, Lombardi 
concludes that those who wish to predict the trajectory of democracy 
and liberalism in the Arab world should not focus myopically on the 
question of how the clause on Shari’a as a source of legislation is 
worded or even whether national constitutions contain provisions 
requiring state law to respect Islam. They should focus equally hard 
on other questions of constitutional design and interpretation of the 
courts.84
Even without going into the details of particular countries’ 
judicial practices, one can distinguish between two different 
foundations of religious and liberal values that theocratic 
constitutionalism can rest on. As we will see, all constitutions of 
Egypt from 1971 until 2014 contain a “constitutional Islamization” 
clause recognizing principles of the Islamic Shari’a as a principle 
source of legislation.85 Here, the degree to which rights such as 
religious freedom and equality are enjoyed depends upon secular 
court jurisprudence. Since 1971, the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court has usually acted as the de facto interpreter of 
religious norms, having developed a creative interpretive technique 
that enables it to construe Shari’a law consistently with human 
rights.86 But similar interpretations can also be found in documents 
written by religious intellectuals. The Declaration of the al-Azhar on 
the Future of Egypt of June 19, 2011, drafted under the auspices of 
the sheikh of al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyeb, essentially aimed to 
determine the social and political principles that should govern the 
future of Egypt. The Declaration defined Islam as the religion of 
82. See Clark B. Lombardi, Constitutional Provisions Making Sharia “A” 
or “The” Chief Source of Legislation: Where Did They Come from? What Do They 
Mean? Do They Matter?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 733, 736 (2013).
83. See id. at 733-74.
84. Id. at 773.
85. See Comparing Egypt’s Constitutions, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Comparing-Egypt-s-
Constitutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q85R-FJXH].
86. See ANVER M. EMON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND ISLAMIC LAW:
DHIMMIS AND OTHERS IN THE EMPIRE OF LAW 166-219 (2012). 
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balance.87 Acting as the relation between religion and state, it poses 
Shari’a as the principal source of legislation but establishes the 
principle of a nation-state that is constitutional; modern and 
democratic; pluralist; founded on the will of the people, dialogue, the 
law, and liberties; and completely opposed to the theocratic state.88
But despite the secular jurisprudence of the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court during the Mubarak era, the greatest challenge 
facing Egyptian regime transition has been the deep moral 
conservatism and hierarchical nature of society—a challenge that 
obviously impacts the design of the institutional structure. Sunni 
Muslims make up 90% of Egyptians. Their religious conservatism 
and acquiescence to social hierarchies is antithetical to the values of
liberal democracy, for example, the ideal of citizenship based on 
equal human dignity, which defined the Tahrir Square Revolution of 
January 2011. That is why revolutionaries spoke of their revolution 
as having been “hijacked” first by the Muslim Brotherhood and later 
by the military.89 According to the Arab Spring’s more pessimistic 
critics, the notion of “revolution” mischaracterizes the events and 
processes in the region. What was happening instead in 2012 was a 
slow and gradual, but deliberate, establishment of Islamic society by 
the Brotherhood and, after July 2013, the return of the military to 
power. The latter interpretation of events suggests that, at least in the 
short run, Islamists did not intend to transgress against the values and 
interests that the West holds dear.90 One indication that this may have 
been the case was the involvement of Egyptian President Mohamed 
Morsi in brokering the Gaza armistice. This interpretation can also 
explain why the Brotherhood’s representatives—who, incidentally, 
tend to be educated and speak foreign languages—assured their 
foreign partners of their commitment to liberty, democracy, human 
rights, and free elections. Yet, at the same time, this new type of 
87. Ahmad al-Tayyeb, al-Azhar Declaration on the Future of Egypt, OFFICE 
OF THE GRAND IMAM OF AL-AZHAR, (June 19, 2011), http://www.bibalex.org/
Attachments/english/elazhar.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML6F-Y9L7]. 
88. See Yadh Ben Achour, The Historical Compromise Between “Civil 
State” and Religion in Post-Revolutionary Arab Neo-Constitutionalism, in
RELIGIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS IN THE MUSLIM MEDITERRANEAN:
THE PLURALISTIC MOMENT 26 (Alessandro Ferrari & James Toronto eds., 2017).
89. Middle East in Focus, Has Egypt’s Revolution Been Hijacked?, MIDDLE 
EAST POLICY COUNCIL (last visited Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.mepc.org/has-egypts-
revolution-been-hijacked?print= [https://perma.cc/6Q6B-K8YW].
90. See Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, This Is Not a Revolution, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/11/08/not-
revolution/ [https://perma.cc/GG36-VMHL].
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Islamic language, which relegated anti-Western and anti-Israel 
rhetoric to the background, could easily have alienated supporters of 
the “Brotherhood.” An early indication of such a trend was that the 
Islamic parties’ support dropped from nearly 70% in the 
parliamentary election91 to 51.7% in the presidential election.92 An 
optimistic reading of these numbers could be that the people 
simultaneously long for Islam and welfare on the one hand and some 
form of democracy on the other, even if they do not conceive of the 
latter as liberal. 
The 2012 constitutional process was dominated by two Islamist 
parties, the Brotherhood and the Salafists. Though the Constitutional 
Court, which was elected during the Mubarak era but achieved some 
measure of independence from the regime, dissolved the elected 
parliament and the committee in charge of drafting the constitution, 
President Morsi appointed another constitutional committee by 
decree. To avert the dissolution of the current committee, which 
most leftist and liberal representatives in the minority had since left, 
Morsi exempted all his acts from the Constitutional Court’s review, 
pursuant to a decree issued on November 22, 2012. A few days later, 
bowing to protests by the judiciary and the threat of an impending 
strike by its members, Morsi signaled a willingness to narrow the 
range of acts exempted from constitutional review but persisted in 
his refusal to submit the decree on the establishment of the 
constitutional drafting committee to constitutional scrutiny. 
Consequently, Egypt’s 2012 Constitution was drafted in line with 
ideas espoused by Islamists, which resulted in the constitutional 
incorporation of the Islamic character of the state, though in a more 
moderate formulation than the one observed in its Iranian 
counterpart. Article 2 of the new constitution (similar to Article 2 of 
the 1971 Constitution) proclaims Islam as the state religion and 
Shari’a as the fundamental underlying principle of legislation. 
Incidentally, even the secular left and liberal parties accepted this 
formulation; the Salafist Al-Nour Party was the only one opposed to 
it, demanding that not only the principles of Shari’a, but its 
91. Matt Bradley, Islamic Parties Dominate Egypt Parliamentary Elections,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2012, 11:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204301404577174832117262816 [https://perma.cc/2Q7B-Q4P4].
92. David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History,
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individual rules too, be designated as sources of legislation, 
including legalization of female genital mutilation, which was 
banned in 2008, as well as the setting of the minimum age of 
marriage at nine years.93
The new Article 3 provide[d] that the principles of religious law[] of 
Egyptian Jews and Egyptian Christians are the main source[s] for 
legislation governing their religious communities and [] family relations. 
“The new Article 4 provide[d] enhanced stature for the Azhar, the 
mosque–college that represents the official religious establishment in 
Egypt.” This Article, in addition to recognizing the Azhar as an 
independent institution, also provide[d] that “the views of the Committee 
of the Senior Scholars are to be taken into account with respect to all
matters having a connection to Islamic law.” Most controversial[] was the 
new Article 219, which provide[d] that the “principles of Islamic law” 
include its universal textual proofs, its rules on theoretical and practical 
jurisprudence, and its material sources as understood by the legal schools 
constituting Sunni Islam.94
In the rights section of the Constitution, Article 43 (similar to 
Article 46 of the 1971 Constitution) declared freedom of belief as an 
inviolable right, adding to the 1971 text that the state shall guarantee 
the freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of 
worship for the divine religions as regulated by law. Article 10 of the 
Constitution (similar to Article 9 of the 1971 text) stated that the 
family is the basis of society and is founded on religion, morality, 
and patriotism. 
The only political force opposed to establishing Islam as the 
state religion was the Free Egypt Party, which enjoyed little popular 
support. It demanded a “civic state,” enshrining the principle of the 
separation of state and church, indeed, even a constitutional 
prohibition on religious parties.95 While an adoption of this 
alternative was not realistic, the question was whether the 
Brotherhood would acquiesce to a moderate jurisprudence that 
resembled the previous judicial practice. In terms of how (liberal) 
democratic the character of the new Egypt would be, a decisive 
93. For an overview of the constitution-making process, and especially the 
new Article 219 and its relationship to Article 2 and Article 4 in the 2012 
Constitution, see Clark Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Islam in Egypt’s New 
Constitution, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 13, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/
12/13/islam-in-egypts-new-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/Y8WS-LX4U].
94. See Mohammad Fadel, Judicial Institutions, the Legitimacy of Islamic 
State Law and Democratic Transition in Egypt: Can a Shift Toward a Common Law 
Model of Adjudication Improve the Prospects of a Successful Democratic 
Transition?, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 646, 647 (2013). 
95. See Lombardi & Brown, supra note 93.
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question was the extent to which the Constitution would, in reality, 
safeguard the independence of ordinary courts and of the 
Constitutional Court as key elements of the system of checks and 
balances, as well as rein in the military’s political and economic 
power. (The military remained influential and continued to control 
40% of the economy, while 70-75% of local municipal leaders were 
still recruited from the ranks of retired members of army and 
police.)96 Another question with relevance to the separation of 
powers was whether the Brotherhood, which supported a 
parliamentary form of government while in opposition, would 
continue to adhere to its previous position after it controlled the 
presidency and in how far it would accede to checks on presidential 
power. In any case, President Morsi’s aforementioned decree of 
November 2012 did not point in this direction and neither did the 
fact that the committee, fearing another ruling by the Constitutional 
Court to dissolve it, had rapidly adopted the text designated as final, 
which was then hurriedly submitted to a referendum by President 
Morsi. Following protests by those opposed to the draft on December 
5, 2012, ten days before the planned referendum, blood was spilt 
again in the streets of Cairo.
Finally, the Egyptian Constituent Assembly approved the 
Constitution on November 30, 2012, and ratified it after a 
referendum on December 15 and 22, 2012.97 That Constitution was 
in force as the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt98 until July 
96. Sharif Abdel Kouddous, What Led to Morsi’s Fall—and What Comes 
Next?, THE NATION (July 5, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/what-led-
morsis-fall-and-what-comes-next/ [https://perma.cc/MHM6-4PTC].
97. See CORNELIS HULSMAN, DIANA SERÔDIO & JAYSON CASPER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF EGYPT’S CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT, AND SORTING 
THROUGH THE RHETORIC 8 (Cornelis Hulsman ed., 2013).
98. THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 
2012, as amended 18 Jan. 2014, unofficial English translation prepared by 
International IDEA, http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/P46T-WXPT]; see
Zaid Al-Ali, The New Egyptian Constitution: An Initial Assessment of Its Merits and 
Flaws, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-
ali/new-egyptian-constitution-initial-assessment-of-its-merits-and-flaws [https://
perma.cc/LE5S-MFU4]. Later evaluations were provided by the working paper 
series of the International IDEA and The Center for Constitutional Transitions at 
NYU Law. See Zaid Al-Ali & Michael Dafel, Egyptian Constitutional Reform and 
the Fight Against Corruption 1-2 (Int’l IDEA & Ctr. for Constitutional Transitions 
NYU Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2013), http://constitutionaltransitions.org/working-
paper-no1/ [https://perma.cc/8PYU-7BPS]; Asanga Welikala, The Legislature 
Under the Egyptian Constitution of 2012 1-2 (Int’l IDEA & Ctr. for Constitutional 
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3, 2013, when military officers, following a forty-eight-hour 
ultimatum handed down by Egypt’s military commander, Abdel 
Fattah Al-Sisi, to President Mohamed Morsi, asking him to end the 
political impasse and respond to the demands of the people, removed 
the country’s first democratically elected president and announced a 
suspension of the Constitution coupled with early presidential and 
parliamentary elections and named the head of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court as interim president.99
On August 14, 2013, Egyptian security forces confronted an 
estimated tens of thousands of supporters of ousted President Morsi. 
“According to the Egyptian Health Ministry, 638 people were killed 
that day. Of those, 595 were civilians, and 43 were police 
officers.”100 On August 19, 2013, a court ordered the release of 
former President Hosni Mubarak. Some analysts said that this 
provided a sign of the return of his authoritarian style of government. 
As proof of this, on September 23, 2013, a court issued an injunction 
dissolving the Brotherhood and confiscating its assets, banning all 
Transitions NYU Law, Working Paper No. 8, 2013), http://constitutionaltransitions.
org/working-paper-no8/ [https://perma.cc/MKK7-SYHW].
99. Due to early indications that there will be amendments to the 2012 
Constitution, a memorandum of International IDEA and The Center for 
Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law, issued in July 2013, offers a brief analysis 
of those provisions of the 2012 Constitution that established the horizontal 
distribution of powers between the legislature, president, and prime minister. The 
study argues that in the pre-Arab Spring era, countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region were dominated by a strong president who centralized 
political power, dominated political processes, and established a one-party state in 
which the president’s political allies controlled the state bureaucracy and security 
services. Constitutional rules facilitated these constitutional failures by failing to 
limit presidential power, undermining the capacity of the legislature to act as a check 
on presidential power, and eliminating institutional procedures and safeguards. 
Constitutional design for the MENA region after the Arab Spring must therefore be 
driven by principles that guard against a repeat of these constitutional failures, while 
at the same time ensuring that government can proceed effectively and efficiently. 
See Sujit Choudhry & Richard Stacey, The 2012 Constitution of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt: Assessing Horizontal Power Sharing Within a Semi-Presidential 
Framework, INT’L IDEA & CTR. CONST. TRANSITIONS NYU L. 1, 1-6 (2013).
100. Yasmine El Rashidi, Scenes from a Crackdown: What Really Happened 
in Cairo?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/
2013/09/11/scenes-from-crackdown-what-happened-cairo/ [https://perma.cc/JX6K-
7Y8G]. On August 14, when Egypt’s security services stormed two squares in Cairo 
where Morsi’s supporters were holding sit-ins, the interim government imposed a 
state of emergency as well as a nighttime curfew, which was lifted after three 
months. See Kareem Fahim, Government in Egypt Eases Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/world/middleeast/government-in-
egypt-eases-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/U5C7-WZME].
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activities “emanating from it” and any institutions “belong[ing] to it 
or receiv[ing] financial support of any kind from it.”101 According to 
the court, the organization “used the Islamic religion as a cover for 
their illicit activities, pushing people to go out in protest on 30 
June.”102 The Brotherhood’s leadership is now in jail and accused of 
inciting violence and colluding with foreign organizations such as 
Hamas. Its assets were frozen. Some schools and hospitals run by the 
organization were raided and closed. Many thousand members were 
detained after July 3, and some of them were reportedly 
mistreated.103
According to a new law promulgated by the interim president 
at the end of November, the government must be notified of all 
gatherings of more than ten people.104 Overnight demonstrations at 
places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which 
controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject 
applications, and the law threatens those who take part in banned 
protests with jail or heavy fines. On December 22 2013, “[T]hree 
activists who played central roles in the uprising against former 
President Hosni Mubarak were convicted [] of participating in recent 
protests and sentenced to three years in prison, raising fears that the 
new government was seeking revenge against opponents of Egypt’s 
old order.”105
Social and charitable groups even loosely associated with the 
Brotherhood struggled after their funds were frozen by the state. It 
was a new level of disruption to a society already riven by violence 
and suspicion in the months since the military ousted President 
Morsi. On December 25 2013, the military-backed government 
declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group, giving the security forces 
101. Ursula Lindsey, Ban of Brothers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013, 10:40 
AM), https://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/ban-of-brothers/ [https://perma.
cc/8BP5-GL4Y]; see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Court Shuts Down the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Seizes Its Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/world/middleeast/egyptian-court-bans-muslim-
brotherhood.html [https://perma.cc/36FJ-G59B]. 
102. See Lindsey, supra note 101.
103. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 101.
104. David D. Kirkpatrick, New Law in Egypt Effectively Bans Street 
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/
middleeast/egypt-law-street-protests.html [https://perma/cc/YWK7-MQDE]. 
105. Kareem Fahim, In Blow to Leadership of ‘11 Revolt, Egypt Activists Are 
Given 3 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
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greater latitude to stamp out a group deeply rooted in Egyptian social 
and civic life.106 “The government had also sought to deny the group 
foreign help or shelter, urging other Arab governments to honor an 
antiterrorism agreement and shun the organization.”107
One of the more theoretical questions regarding the failure of 
the original democratic aspirations of the Arab Spring in Egypt so far 
is whether the failure proves again the robustness of authoritarianism 
in the Middle East. For most “Middle East specialists, the events of 
the Arab Spring proved especially jarring, even if welcomed, 
because of their extensive investment in analyzing the underpinnings 
of authoritarian persistence, long the region’s political hallmark.”108
The empirical surprise of 2011 raised the pressing question whether 
the specialists needed to rethink the logic of authoritarianism in the 
Arab world. One of these specialists argues that the Middle East was 
not singularly authoritarian because it lacked the prerequisites of 
democratization (whether cultural, socioeconomic, or institutional), 
because of the exceptional will and capacity of the coercive 
apparatus (firstly the military, and then the security forces too) to 
repress.109 The main question in January and February 2011 in Cairo 
was whether the military would shoot the protesters. As we know, 
they did not. These events in Egypt (as well as similar events in 
Tunisia two months earlier) highlighted an empirical novelty in the 
Arab world, namely, the manifestation of huge, cross-class popular 
protests in the name of political change, as well as a new factor that 
abetted the materialization of this phenomenon, the spread of social 
media.110 As we know now, the attitude of the military changed 
during the summer of 2013, which may be another reason for the 
reconsideration of the nature of authoritarianism in Egypt.111 The 
106. Kareem Fahim & Mayy el Sheikh, Egypt Broadens New Crackdown on 
Brotherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/
world/middleeast/explosion-cairo.html [https://perma.cc/S76S-XK48]. 
107. See id.
108. See Eva Bellin, Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in 
the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, 44 COMP. POL. 127, 127 (2012).
109. See id. at 128. 
110. See Eva Bellin, The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective, 36 COMP. POL. 139, 144 (2004). Eight 
years later, she reconsidered her earlier writing. See Bellin, supra note 108, at 142-
43. 
111. In his book, Thanassis Cambanis argues that Egyptians have paid a 
heavy price for their centuries-long tradition of authoritarian rule and the consequent 
political inexperience of its opponents at all levels. The supporters of democracy in 
Egypt, he claims, always held a weaker hand than the outside world imagined. 
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Egyptian army, a state within a state that used to protect its interest 
from the shadows, with the new constitution voted in mid-January 
2014, took bolder steps to cement its power and assert overtly that it 
is accountable to no one. Article 234 gives the military the final say 
over who may be appointed as defense minister. Other articles 
mandate the military’s budget be listed as a single entry in national 
accounts and that civilians may be tried before military courts if they 
assault members of the armed forces in military zones and military-
owned properties, which in Egypt includes at least a quarter of the 
country’s economy. 
The lessons to be learned from the failure are that one party 
cannot rule alone at a time of socio-political polarization and 
transformation, and that the new constitution, as a long-term social 
contract among Egyptians of varying ideological bents and ethnic 
class and religious backgrounds, must be redrafted in ways 
acceptable to key political players and constituents, including the 
Brotherhood and their allies. International support, including that of 
the United States, could have been important in limiting the creation 
of partisan constitutions in a situation of deep political division and 
power concentration in one group. Unfortunately in the case of 
Egypt, outsiders, like the United States and the European Union, 
have not really found proper mechanisms for how to do this. As a 
result, they are awkwardly defending—with their lack of 
condemnation of events—a de facto military coup, which cannot be a 
legitimate tool against a democratically elected president.112 Many 
argue now that, following the Arab Spring, the society was too 
deeply divided for an election and for a new constitution.113 But if 
Mubarak fell because of pressure from below, but also because the Egyptian Army 
was alienated by his plan to have his son Gamal succeed him. See THANASSIS 
CAMBANIS, ONCE UPON A REVOLUTION: AN EGYPTIAN STORY (2015). 
112. These are different approaches by two New York Times columnists. For 
the first, see Thomas L. Friedman, Can Egypt Pull Together?, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/opinion/sunday/friedman-can-egypt-
pull-together.html [https://perma.cc/5KBT-T9SB], and for the second, see David 
Brooks, Defending the Coup, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/05/opinion/brooks-defending-the-coup.html [https://perma.cc/SPV7-
NXQY]. Brooks is “defending the coup,” because “Egypt . . . seems to lack even the 
basic mental ingredients [for democracy].” Id.
113. See Paul Collier, Democracy in Dangerous Places: Egypt—What Went 
Wrong?, SOC. EUR. (July 12, 2013), https://www.socialeurope.eu/2013/07/democracy-
in-dangerous-places-egypt-what-went-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/3WJY-LGM6]. There 
are similar arguments after the coup and the massacres of Morsi’s supporters that, 
rather than forcing Cairo to hold elections and threatening to suspend aid if it does 
not, suggest that Washington should press the current leadership to adhere to clear 
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these decisions were made by the people of Egypt, even if not all of 
them were listened to in the process, the consequences of their 
choices have to be fixed by them, too, and not by any external forces,
even in an extreme, emergency situation. It would have been ideal if 
the new, suspended constitution had provided any legitimate solution 
as to how to get rid of an incompetent and unpopular president. This 
is the fault of the Brotherhood but also those who supported the 
transition. In the absence of such a constitutional approach, not the 
coup but a real revolution is the only solution since in the case of the 
involvement of the military there are no guarantees against a military 
dictatorship. Of course, even after a revolution, guarantees are 
needed to secure the consensual character of the transitional process. 
After the Brotherhood’s Constitution was suspended, Egypt’s 
military-backed government began a two-phase process of creating a 
new constitution. During the first phase, the regime tasked a 
committee of ten judges, law professors, and legal scholars with 
drafting a list of constitutional amendments. In the second phase, it 
appointed a committee of fifty representatives from various state 
institutions and social groups to build upon these amendments and 
write a new constitution. According to its president, Amr Moussa, a
former minister of foreign affairs for Egypt in the Mubarak era and 
secretary general of the Arab League, “the committee of fifty gave 
everyone a seat at the table, including Egyptian feminists, young 
people,” and religious groups, including the Brotherhood, which did 
not respond to the invitation.114 Moussa argued that the document, 
which was finalized on December 1, 2013, and put to a vote on 
January 14, 2014, as the start of a two-day referendum, “turns the 
page decisively on both the [1971 and the 2012] Constitutions and [] 
marks a historic step on the path to a government that is of, by[,] and 
for the Egyptian people.”115 External observers like myself should be 
more cautious, remembering that the previous Constitution, prepared 
almost exclusively by the Brotherhood, was also approved by a
standards of responsible governance, including ending the violence and political 
repression, restoring the basic functions of the state, facilitating economic recovery, 
countering militant extremists, and keeping the peace with Israel. See also Charles 
A. Kupchan, Democracy in Egypt Can Wait, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/opinion/democracy-in-egypt-can-wait.html 
[https://perma.cc/CH9N-ZD9U].
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referendum with 63% of the vote. This new Constitution seems to go 
into the other extreme of an illiberal constitution, as it was drafted 
with minimal input from Islamist perspectives and could further 
crush the Brotherhood by banning political parties based on religion. 
Therefore for those who saw the military as a better alternative to the 
Brotherhood in July 2013, the new Constitution, which gives special 
privileges to the military, certainly cannot be considered as a 
revolutionary one but rather as a document of Egypt’s 
counterrevolution.116 Unfortunately, as the United States backed 
Mubarak’s regime until its very last days, even during the mass 
protests of January 2011, the United States hoped Mubarak could 
survive if he made political concessions. But the United States is not 
alone in this: Diplomatic support from Europe and Japan, which 
suffered minor interruption when the repression peaked late in the 
summer of 2013, has largely been restored. “The West appears to see 
no contradiction in supporting the ‘stability’ of the [Al-]Sisi regime 
at a time when the Egyptian population is suffering from the extreme 
instability that comes with mass arrests and torture.”117
The 2014 Constitution has removed Article 219, favored by the 
Islamists, and added Article 11 to the provision on the family, which 
provides that the state is committed to achieving equality between 
women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, 
including Article 2 on the principles of Islamic Shari’a. Despite these 
changes, however, the 2014 text in all religious matters is very 
similar to the 2012 Constitution, which was itself based on the 
previous constitution adopted in 1971. But one cannot forget the fact 
that the ban of the Brotherhood, the largest Islamist party in the 
country, very much affects the religious rights of their previous 
members and supporters. And contrary to the situation during the 
Mubarak and the Morsi eras, the Supreme Constitutional Court does 
not play any role in protecting these religious rights. 
CONCLUSION
Constitutions in the modern world often have a great deal to 
say about religious liberty. Liberal constitutions require freedom of 
116. Sara Khorshid, Egypt’s Counterrevolution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/opinion/egypts-counterrevolution.html 
[https://perma.cc/L2FE-UJTV].
117. See Tom Stevenson, Sisi’s Way, 37 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (Feb. 19, 
2015).
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religious belief and propitious conditions for collective worship. 
Illiberal constitutions often intermingle religion and state authority to 
the point where an official religion dries out contenders or where 
religious doctrine had direct legal status. Some illiberal constitutions 
ban any religious influence on political life. In this Article, I tried to 
catalog the different sorts of constitutional orders and provide a 
theoretical account of their differences, before focusing in on three 
constitutional approaches. One of them, Israel, as a religiously 
deeply divided society in recent years, turns to religion to justify its 
claim to statehood. In response to persistent delegitimation from 
within and without, the current government seems to support 
nonsecular Zionism’s efforts to expand the role of religion as a form 
of political legitimation. This “religionization” of Israeli Jewish 
society together with an ethnic division within the framework of a 
single territorial entity (due to the failure of the political leadership to 
reach a two-state territorial solution) leads to a Jewish nationalism, 
based on a collective identity rooted in religious foundations, which 
might well defeat “Israeliness” as identity, as well as the importance 
of democratic principles, including the rights of national and
religious minorities. Similarly, in Egypt and Hungary, the growing 
importance of religion in national legitimation was one of the 
reasons that these two of the world’s newest constitutions have taken 
an illiberal path toward religious intolerance and associated 
persecution of religious groups. 
One of the lessons to be learned from these case studies is that 
different constitutional models of state–religion relationships alone 
do not indicate the very status of religious rights in a polity, as the 
three countries investigated here represent three distinct approaches: 
Hungary being a formally secular country, Israel an accomodationist, 
and Egypt a theocratic one. As we saw in the case of Hungary, the 
secular model is not necessarily tolerant because individuals cannot 
exercise their rights to religious freedom unless they belong to a 
religious group recognized by the Parliament, and the theocratic 
model can be tolerant, as was the case in Egypt during the Mubarak 
era due to the rather liberal practice of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. In Israel, it is also not the state–religion model and the status 
quo compromise themselves that make religious freedom more 
difficult, but the fact that the State of Israel for the sake of the 
religious freedom of (ultra)Orthodox Jews, who as a political faction 
do not exhibit appropriate respect for the rights of its non-Orthodox 
religious, non-religious Jewish, and non-Jewish citizens, lost control 
over its own religious establishment much more than countries with 
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similarly established churches. Also, the religious divide is different 
in the three cases: Israel is religiously deeply divided, while Egypt 
and Hungary are more homogenous, though they have very distinct 
cultural histories. In all cases, the political aspirations for more 
illiberal constitutionalism, although in the cases of Israel and 
Hungary after a liberal democratic period, while in Egypt without 
such experiences, seemed to be the decisive element to find similarly 
restrictive measures for freedom of religion. Conversely, coming 
back to the question of whether secularism is a nonnegotiable aspect 
of liberal constitutionalism, one can argue that freedom of religion 
can also be provided by nonsecular state–church approaches. This 
tendency of liberal constitutionalism is parallel with the 
desecularization of the world, even despite a shift in the institutional 
location of religion, such as the rapid decline in church-related 
religion.118 In other words, the worldwide resurgence of religion 
forces liberal constitutionalism to adapt religious rights to different 
state–church relationships.
118. See PETER L. BERGER, THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD:
RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 3 (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999). 
